What each password manager encrypts
Every vendor encrypts your passwords. The differences are in the rest: whether the websites you log in to are readable on their servers, how hard your master password is to guess offline, and whether a second secret is needed.
On the server, field by field
19 managers that sync through a company's servers. Local-file managers have no server copy.
Passwordsencrypted by 19 of 19
Secure notesencrypted by 17 of 19, 2 not verified
Website addressesencrypted by 15 of 19, 3 not verified
Item and folder namesencrypted by 13 of 19, 5 not verified
EncryptedReadable on the serverVendor doesn't clearly say
Master password hashing
How your master password becomes the key. Memory-hard methods make guessing on cracking hardware much slower.
- PBKDF210 of 23
- Argon2dmemory-hard1 of 23
- Argon2idmemory-hard1 of 23
- bcrypt1 of 23
- scryptmemory-hard1 of 23
- Not documented9 of 23
1 of 23 add a secret key on top of the master password: 1Password.
Every manager, side by side
Hover a cell for the vendor's wording. Profiles link to the sources.
Swipe the table sideways for more columns.
| Password manager | End-to-end | Website addresses | Item and folder names | Master password hashing | Secret key |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
 Apple PasswordsBuilt in | YesYes | Encrypted | Encrypted | Not documentedProtected by the device passcode, Secure Enclave and iCloud Keychain recovery (rate-limited escrow); not a classic master-password KDF | Not applicable |
 Firefox password managerBuilt in | YesYes | Encrypted | Not verified | Not documentedSync: PBKDF2 (historically 1,000 rounds client-side) then HKDF, plus server-side scrypt (N=65536, r=8, p=1) on auth tokens; local Primary Password KDF parameters unknown | Not applicable |
 Google Password ManagerBuilt in | Off by defaultOff by default | Not verified | Not verified | Not documented | Not applicable |
 Microsoft Edge password managerBuilt in | NoNo | Not verified | Not verified | Not documentedNo master-password KDF; local data is protected by OS key storage and sync keys are managed by Microsoft | Not applicable |
 EnpassLocal file | YesYes | No server copy | No server copy | PBKDF2PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA512, 320,000 iterations (master password, optionally with a keyfile) | NoNo |
 KeePassLocal file | YesYes | No server copy | No server copy | Not documented | NoNo |
 KeePassXCLocal file | YesYes | No server copy | No server copy | Not documented | NoNo |
 StrongboxLocal file | YesYes | No server copy | No server copy | Not documented | NoNo |
 1PasswordStandalone | YesYes | Encrypted | Encrypted | PBKDF2PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256, 650,000 iterations on the account password, combined with a 128-bit Secret Key via HKDF (Two-Secret Key Derivation) | YesYes |
 Avira Password ManagerStandalone | YesYes | Encrypted | Encrypted | PBKDF2PBKDF2; iteration count not established | Not verifiedNot verified |
 BitwardenStandalone | YesYes | Encrypted | Encrypted | PBKDF2PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256, 600,000 iterations (default); optional Argon2id, 32 MiB memory, 6 iterations, 4 parallelism | NoNo |
 DashlaneStandalone | YesYes | Encrypted | Encrypted | Argon2dmemory-hardArgon2d, 3 iterations, 32 MB memory, parallelism 2; PBKDF2-SHA2 200,000 iterations as fallback | NoNo |
 Kaspersky Password ManagerStandalone | YesYes | Encrypted | Encrypted | PBKDF2PBKDF2, 600,000 iterations | Not verifiedNot verified |
 KeeperStandalone | YesYes | Encrypted | Encrypted | PBKDF2PBKDF2, 1,000,000 iterations to derive the Master Password Key that unwraps the Data Key; a separate 1,000,000 iterations for authentication | NoNo |
 LastPassStandalone | YesYes | Encrypted | Encrypted | PBKDF2PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256, 600,000 iterations (current default; username as salt) | NoNo |
 NordPassStandalone | YesYes | Encrypted | Encrypted | Argon2idmemory-hardArgon2id with a 16-byte salt; memory, iteration and parallelism parameters are not published | NoNo |
 Norton Password ManagerStandalone | YesYes | Encrypted | Not verified | Not documented | NoNo |
 PassboltStandalone | YesYes | Not verified | Not verified | Not documented | Not verifiedNot verified |
 Proton PassStandalone | YesYes | Encrypted | Encrypted | bcryptbcrypt (cost 10) of the account password plus salt protects the user key; vault items use random 32-byte AES-256-GCM vault keys | NoNo |
 PsonoStandalone | YesYes | Encrypted | Encrypted | scryptmemory-hardscrypt N=2^14 (16 MiB), r=8, p=1, 64-byte output | Not verifiedNot verified |
 RoboFormStandalone | YesYes | Encrypted | Encrypted | PBKDF2PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256 with a 32-byte salt; iteration count user-configurable | NoNo |
 Sticky PasswordStandalone | YesYes | Encrypted | Encrypted | PBKDF2PBKDF2 with salt, 'several thousands of iterations' | NoNo |
 Zoho VaultStandalone | YesYes | Readable | Readable | PBKDF2PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256 with a random salt; iteration count not clearly stated | NoNo |
Why website addresses matter
In the 2022 LastPass breach, attackers copied customer vault backups. Passwords and notes were encrypted, but website addresses were not, so the thieves could see which sites each person used and pick targets before trying to crack master passwords offline.
A long, unique master password is still the main defence. Hashing settings and a secret key decide how much an attacker has to spend on each guess.